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Using new institutionalism as a theoretical framework means focusing on two themes: rules in organizations, and informal 
links. These two themes might form the theoretical ground for the explanation of the many problems in Belgrade in the 1990s, 
for example, of illegal building. Instead of an analysis of the rigid structures of communist institutions and inherited 
weaknesses, the attention will be on the new institutions or more precisely, rules and routines created in the new political 
system, as well as corruption being the most dominant one. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Due to the complex political causes of the 
development of Belgrade in the last decade, it 
is difficult to apply a single theory to 
understand urban politics. The aim of this work 
is to give a new framework that is applicable 
for analysis of a Belgrade’s political context 
and governance from the 1990s onwards. 
Classic political theories like the elitism and 
pluralism approaches in urban politics, 
although useful, are not completely explanatory 
because they are mostly shaped and used in 
the Anglo-American context. This context is 
characterised by liberal capitalism and a 
pluralist democracy. Contrary to this, 
Yugoslavia was characterised by a command 
economy and a one-party system until the late 
1980s. The 1990s were characterised by a very 
different economic and political environment 
that failed to develop either democratic 
political institutions or free market institutions. 
Indeed that period was a specific form of post-
modern dictatorship (Prodanovic, 2000), which 
was different from any other in the world. The 
main characteristic of this system was the 
collapse of existing institutions, the transferring 
of power from institutions to private hands and 
massive corruption. Since corruption is a sum 
of fundamental economic, political and institu-
tional causes, addressing corruption effectively 
means tackling these underlying causes. 
Consequently, given that classical political 
studies do not take corruption into considera-
tion, there is a need to apply a new approach, 
and new institutionalism may provide a good 
theoretical framework for explanation for exis-
ting problems. As stated above, since corrup-
tion is a symptom of fundamental economic, 
political and institutional weaknesses, it needs 
to be viewed within a broader governance 
framework. The newly created institutional 
framework of the post-communist era did not 
take an organisational form, but it was based 
on new rules created and old rules constrained 
by corrupt politicians. As a consequence of its 
loss of power the ‘cripple state’ was unable to 
control its bureaucracy, to protect property and 
contractual rights, or to provide institutions that 
support the rule of law (Prodanovic, 2000). 
Political behaviour became a function of 
financial motivations and expectations.  
OLD INSTITUTIONALISM  
In order to understand new institutionalism it is 
necessary to explain the old institutionalism 
upon which the newer version is built which 
reflects some features and characteristics of 
the older approach in understanding politics. 
However, there are significant variations from 
the older institutionalism.  
Old institutionalists developed an important 
body of literature that was the foundation for 
development of new institutionalism as well as 
for the other schools of thought that emerged 
in parallel. Although it has been much critici-
sed for its descriptive richness and methodo-
logy that was mainly based on observations 
and descriptions (Peters, 1999), old institutio-
nalism gave a good impetus for the further re-
search of political institutions and political life. 
The main concern of old institutionalists was to 
analyse the nature of governing institutions that 
were capable of structure the behaviour of indivi-
duals towards better ends and collective purposes 
(Peters, 1999). The most famous school of old 
institutionalists was the school of the Progressive 
Movement in the United States, which consider 
political science as the study of the State and an 
exercise in formal-legal analysis, and that 
constituted the basis of political science research 
for much of the late nineteenth and first half of 
twentieth centuries (Peters, 1999). 
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Peters characterises old institutionalism as 
“normative, structuralist, historicist, legalist, 
and holistic” (Peters, 1998:11). Legalism 
emerges from its concern with law and the 
central role of the law in governing. According 
to old institutionalists law constitutes both the 
framework of the public sector itself and a 
major way in which government can affect the 
behaviour of its citizens. Therefore, to be 
concerned with political institutions was and is 
to be concerned with law. Structuralism is the 
second dominant assumption of old institutio-
nalism. The assumption that structures deter-
mine behaviour was the main point of the 
critique by behaviourists later because they 
consider that structuralism does not leave 
room for the impact of individuals. Holism 
represents the comparative nature of old 
institutionalists. They had a strategy of 
comparing the whole systems, rather than to 
examine individual institutions such as 
legislatures. The main critique of this approach 
is that it tended towards generalisation and 
consequently, made theory construction more 
difficult.  Historicism is another feature of old 
institutionalism. Old institutionalists were 
concerned with how contemporary political 
systems were embedded in their historical 
development as well as in their socio-
economic and cultural present. For them, 
individual behaviour, especially of political 
elite, was a function of their collective history 
and of their understanding of the meaning of 
their politics as influenced by history (Peters, 
1999). However, for the contemporary, more 
individualistic approaches, the deep-rooted 
conception of history is not that relevant 
(Bates, 1998). Finally, the older institutiona-
lists tended to have a strong normative compo-
nent in their analysis. They often affiliated their 
descriptive statements about politics with a 
concern for ‘good government’ (Peters, 1999), 
which was consequently criticized as “not 
scientific” (Storing, 1962). 
Old institutionalism was focused upon formal 
rules and organizations rather than informal 
conventions, and upon official structures of 
government rather than broader institutional 
constraints on governance (in public, private 
and civil spheres). It has been criticised for its 
descriptive method and disdain for theory. New 
institutionalism has emerged from old and 
from vulgar institutionalisms that were a ‘sad 
and misleading caricature of institutionalism 
today’ (Lowndes, 2001). However, the deve-
lopment of new institutionalism was preceded 
by Behaviourist and Rational Choice theories.  
BEHAVIOURISTS AND RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORISTS  
These preceding approaches were the most 
influential at the development of new institu-
tionalism. Although different from one another 
in some respects, they share some common 
features including a concern with theory and 
methodology, anti-normative bias, assump-
tions of individualism and imputism (Peters, 
1999). The focus of inquiry of individual 
behaviourism is often individual, whether as a 
voter, as a holder of opinions, or as a member 
of the political elite. For rational choice 
analysis the assumptions of individual utility 
maximization tends to drive the whole 
approach. According to behaviourists, social 
collectivities such as political parties, interest 
groups and legislatures do not make decisions 
but people within those collectivities do. “What 
matters is not what people are supposed to do, 
but what they actually do” (Goodin, 1996: 13). 
The institutionalists’ answer on those theories 
is that the “same people would make different 
choices depending upon the nature of the 
institution within which they are operating at 
the time” (Peters, 1999: 14).  
Old institutionalism concentrates on the formal 
institutions of government and the Constitu-
tions which produce those structures. The 
behavioural revolution in political science con-
centrates completely on the reverse process 
and analyses the inputs from society into the 
political system (Easton, 1953). Although 
institutionalism excluded many interesting and 
important features of political mass behaviour, 
the behavioural revolution went to the other 
extreme and denied the importance of formal 
institutions in determining the outputs of 
government. “It was the behaviour, not the per-
formance of government that was the principal 
concern” (Peters, 1999: 14). Furthermore, only 
the economy and society was considered to 
influence politics and political institutions. 
Institutionalism, both old and new, argues that 
causation goes in both directions and that 
institutions shape social and economic life. 
Rational choice theory does admit the that 
institutions do possess some influence over 
participants because institutional rules estab-
lish the parameters for individual behaviour 
(Buchanan and Tullock, in Peters, 1999:15) 
but still deny their significance in shaping the 
preferences of the participants (Peters, 1999). 
The perfect generality of their applicability has 
been greatly exaggerated (Goodin, 1996). “The 
behaviourists’ focus usefully serves to fix 
attention upon agency, upon individuals and 
groupings of individuals whose behaviour it is. 
But those individuals are shaped by, and in 
their collective enterprises act, thorough struc-
tures and organisations and institutions. What 
people want to do, and what they can do, 
depends importantly upon what organizational 
technology is available or can be made readily 
available to them for giving effect to their indi-
vidual and collective volitions” (Goodin, 
1996:13). Another critique from Goodin is 
related to organizational technology and gover-
nance explanation. “Governance is nothing less 
than the steering of society by officials in 
control of what are organisationally the ‘com-
manding heights’ of society” (Goodin, 1996: 
13). However there are limits to the sorts of 
commands that might effectively issued from 
those commanding heights, and managers of 
the states face various constraints, both in what 
others will let them do and in what others will 
help them to do. Therefore they are constrained 
both in their ‘relative autonomy’ and in ‘their 
power to command’. Behaviourists were 
insufficiently sensitive to those constraints, and 
consequently the state has returned as a key 
focus in order to complement their theories 
(Goodin, 1996). 
The initial advocates of the new institutio-
nalism, James March and Johan Olsen, who 
named the movement in 1984, reasserted 
some of the features of the old institutionalism, 
and they also argued that behavioural and 
rational choice analyses were characterized by: 
Contextualism, Reductionism, Utilitarianism, 
Functionalism, and Instrumentalism (March 
and Olsen, 1984). 
Contextualism means that instead of the central 
role that was given to the State, political 
science depends upon society (March and 
Olsen, 1984). Reductionism refers to the 
tendency of both behavioural and rational 
choice analysis to reduce collective behaviour  
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to individual behaviour. Utilitarianism repre-
sents the tendency to value decisions for what 
they produce for the individual, rather than as 
representing some intrinsic value of their own 
and it is more linked to rational choice than to 
behavioural theory (March and Olsen, 1984). 
Functionalism represents a critique of the way 
in which the behavioural and rational choice 
approaches had dealt with history. Institutio-
nalists tend to assume much less functionality 
in history than behaviourists and rational 
choice theorists. And finally, March and Olsen 
argued that contemporary political science was 
characterized by instrumentalism, or the 
domination of outcomes over process, identity, 
and other important socio-political values 
(1984). In other words, they criticized 
contemporary theorists in that they analyzed 
political life as simply something done it 
through the public sector rather than as a 
complex interaction of symbols, values, and 
even the emotive aspects of the political 
process (March and Olsen, 1984). 
On the basis of these criticism of political 
science of the time March and Olsen (1984) 
argued for the creation of new institutionalism, 
and they offered a replacement for the five pre-
vailing characteristics of political science with a 
focus on collective action for the understanding 
of political life. Furthermore, the relationship 
between political collectivities and their socio-
economic environment should be more reci-
procal in order to explain complex political life. 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH 
The new institutionalism which emerged in the 
1980s was a reaction to the dominance of 
under socialised accounts of social, economic 
and political behaviour. Both behaviourists and 
rational choice theorists had regarded institu-
tions as “epiphenomenal or as the aggregation 
of individual actions” (Lowndes, 2001:1950). 
In the first case, institutions were regarded as a 
result of individual roles, and in the second as 
an accumulation of individual choices based 
upon utility maximising preferences (Shepsle, 
1989). In political science, March and Olsen, 
argued ‘the organisation of political life makes 
a difference’ and asserted a more autonomous 
role for institutions in shaping political 
behaviour (March and Olsen, 1984). Contrary 
to the descriptive and theoretical style of the 
earlier institutional theories, new institutio-
nalism developed a more sophisticated 
definition of their subject matter, operating 
through explicit theoretical frameworks.  
“The new institutionalists concern themsel-
ves with informal conventions as well as for-
mal rules and structures, they pay attention 
to the way in which institutions embody va-
lues and power relationships, and they study 
not just the impact of institutions upon beha-
viour, but interaction between individuals 
and institutions” (Lowndes, 2001:1953).  
Where there is a creation of new type of institu-
tions, new institutionalism can provide power-
ful tools for understanding change inside local 
government bureaucracies and for conceptua-
lising ‘the strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter in 
Lowndes, 2001). Lowndes (2001) also distin-
guishes organizations from institutions and 
outlines regards ‘weak ties’ to be as important 
as formal constitutions.  
Lowndes presented differences between new 
and vulgar or ‘old’ institutionalism in terms of 
movement along six analytical points: 
• From a focus on organizations to a focus on 
rules; 
• From formal to an informal conception of 
institutions; 
• From a static to a dynamic conception of 
institutions; 
• From sub emerged values to a value critical 
stance; 
• From a holistic to a disaggregated 
conception of institutions; and 
• From independence to embeddedness 
(Lowndes, 2001). 
Political institutions should not be equated 
with political organizations, rather they are the 
sets of rules that guide and constrain actors’ 
behaviour. Institutions provide the rule of the 
game, while organizations and individuals are 
players within that game. As Goodin states, 
institutions are differentiated in the sense that 
they embody, preserve, and impart differential 
power resources with respect to different 
individuals and groups (Goodin 1996). That 
means that institutions embody power relations 
by privileging certain courses of actions over 
others and by including certain actors and 
excluding others. “Institutional rules may pro-
duce variation and deviation as well as 
conformity and standardisation. They evolve in 
unpredictable ways as actors seek to make 
sense of new or ambiguous situations, ignore 
or even contravene existing rules, or try to 
adapt them to favour their own interests” 
(Lowndes, 2001:1960). 
Due to its complexity and the wealth of 
literature on the subject, there is a problem 
with defining of new institutionalism. Therefore 
it is crucial to see what criteria should be used 
for defining whether an approach is really 
institutional or not. Peters attempted to define a 
common core that binds all approaches toget-
her. The most important element of institutio-
nalism, according to Peters, is that institutions 
are a structural feature of a society and/or polity. 
That structure may be formal like a legislature, 
an agency in the public bureaucracy, or a legal 
framework, or may be informal like the set of 
shared norms or a network of interacting 
organisations. Another feature is the existence 
of stability over time. A third feature is that it 
must affect individual behaviour or in some 
way constrain the behaviour of its members. 
There should be some sense of shared values 
and meaning among the members of insti-
tutions. Those constraints may be formal or 
informal but they must be constraints if there is 
to be an institution in place (Peters, 1998).  
According to Peters, the first of six different 
approaches in new institutionalism is Normative 
institutionalism advanced by March and Olsen in 
their works 1984 and 1989. The strong accent 
is on the norms of institutions as means of 
understanding how they function and how they 
determine individual behaviour. They put an 
accent on the ‘logic of appropriateness’ as a 
tool for shaping the behaviour of the members 
of institutions. The most different to normative 
institutionalism is Rational Choice 
Institutionalism. Instead of values and norms, 
those scholars argue that behaviours are 
functions of rules and incentives. According to 
them, institutions are systems of rules and 
inducements to behaviour in which individuals 
attempt to maximise their own utilities (Wein-
gast, 1996). The third approach is Historical 
Institutionalism which, represents the view that 
choices which are made early in the history of 
any policy or any governmental systems. As 
those scholars argued policies are path  
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dependant and ‘once launched on that path 
they continue along until some sufficiently 
strong political force deflects them from it’ 
(Peters, 1998: 19). Empirical institutionalism is 
the closest to old institutionalist and argues 
that that the structure of government makes a 
difference in the way in which policies are 
processed and which choices which will be 
made by governments. Peters also differen-
tiates those scholars into two groups. First, 
scholars who use conventional categories such 
as the difference between presidential and 
parliamentary government like Weaver and 
Rockman (1993) and second, those who use 
more analytic categories such as decision 
points, like Immergut (1992).  
Other varieties of institutionalism, but with 
more connections, are International Institutio-
nalism, of which the most clear example is 
international regime theory as represented by 
Krasner (1983) and Societal Institutionalism 
that describes the structuring of the relation-
ship between state and society (Peters, 1998). 
DEFINITION OF ‘INSTITUTION’ 
The most fundamental issue is to define what 
an institution is. As Peters states, the word 
institution is loosely used in political science 
to mean everything from a formal structure like 
a parliament to very amorphous entities like 
social class, with other components of the 
socio-political universe, such as law and mar-
kets, also being defined as being institutions. 
In sociology it is often used interchanging with 
the term ‘organization’ (Peters, 1999).  
March and Olsen have a different definition of 
institutions. According to them institutions 
should rather be understood as a collection of 
norms, rules and understandings, and perhaps 
most importantly routines (March and Olsen, 
1989). They define institutions as: 
“Collections of interrelated rules and routi-
nes that define appropriate actions in terms 
of relations between roles and situations. The 
process involves determining of what the 
situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and 
what obligation of that role in that situation 
is” (March and Olsen, 1989: 21). 
Furthermore, they define institutions also in 
terms of the characteristics that they represent 
and that their members demonstrate. They also 
define institutions by their durability and their 
capability to influence the behaviour of indivi-
duals for generations (March and Olsen, 1994: 
99). They argue that institutions possess an 
inherent legitimacy that obligates their members 
to behave in ways that may even violate their 
own self interest (March and Olsen, 1994: 23).  
The most important feature of the March and 
Olsen conceptualisation is that ‘institutions 
tend to have a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that 
influences behaviour more than a ‘logic of 
consequentiality’ that also might shape indivi-
dual action. That is, if an institution is an 
effective in influencing the behaviour of its 
members, those members will think more 
about whether an action conforms to the norms 
of the organisation than about what the 
consequences will be for member themselves 
(Peters, 1999). The extreme example he gives 
is of firemen who willingly enter blazing buil-
dings because that is the role they have 
accepted as a function of their job. In less 
extreme situation, logic of appropriateness may 
be manifested through activities in public 
institutions, like serving clients as well as 
possible and not engaging in corruption on the 
job (Heidenheimer, 1989).  
In this normative conception of institutions it is 
the routine that appears most important. How-
ever, March and Olsen assume that institutions 
are not so well developed that there are chances 
for the development of anomalous situations and 
consequently there is a need for the creation of 
enforcement mechanisms to deal with deviant 
cases. But still for the most of decisions routines 
will be sufficient to generate appropriate 
performance (March and Olsen, 1994). 
The major critique of March and Olsen’s work is 
related to making a distinction between rules 
and routines. March and Olsen defined routines 
as a stable pattern of behaviour, without the 
sense of it being unchangeable or dysfunctional. 
Routines are assumed to make the behaviour of 
organisation more predictable and more rational, 
although it is difficult to determine when 
predictability ends and inertia begins (Peters, 
1999). Although not considering rules to be 
central to their research as most of the new 
institutionalists, March and Olsen do address 
rules as a part of the control of behaviour within 
institutions and organisations. They consider 
rules as constitutive and to some extent as the 
formalisation of the logic of appropriateness 
(March and Olsen, 1994). Rules serve as guides 
for newcomers to an organisation for example. 
Institutions derive a good deal of their structure 
of meaning, and their logic of appropriateness 
from the society in which they are formed 
(March and Olsen, 1984). Routines appear to 
arise naturally once people begin to interact in 
institutional setting (Peters, 1999). 
Finally, the third question that March and Olsen 
have not answered according to Peters, is the 
difference between an institution and an orga-
nisation. He adds that it is easier to make the 
distinction if the adjective ‘formal’ is added in 
front of ‘organisation’ thus applying a very 
strict definition of organisations, and a loose, 
more culturally based, definition of institutions 
(Peters, 1999). 
One of the strongest and most persuasive 
components of March and Olsen argument is 
the change of institutions based on their 
‘garbage can’ approach to decision-making 
(Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). The ‘garbage 
can’ approach means that institutions have a 
repertoire of solutions as responses to prob-
lems when there is a need to adjust policies. 
Routinized responses are used before sear-
ching for alternatives that are further away from 
core values. Therefore, institutional changes 
that are implemented conform to the logic of 
appropriateness, and those institutional values 
have the function of limiting the range of 
extending policy alternatives for the institution. 
Institutional change is thus rarely a planned 
event, but rather a product of the confluence of 
several different activities, and opportunities for 
action, within the institution (Cohen, March 
and Olsen, 1972). 
According to Peters, there are several different 
stimuli for change, but the new institutionalists 
mostly concentrate on the process of learning 
(1999). According to Goodin there are three 
basic ways in which institutions arise and 
change over time: as the result of accident, 
evolution or intentional intervention (Goodin in 
Lowndes, 2001). Another interesting issue is a 
mechanism through which the institutions 
shape the behaviour of individuals, and the 
other mechanism through which individuals are 
able to influence and reform institutions. Gid- 
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dens has argued that these relationships are 
‘dual, which means there is a reciprocal causa-
tion of agent and structure’ (Giddens, 1984), 
implying the dynamism of this relationship. 
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN URBAN 
POLITICS 
In his article on urban governance, Pierre 
argues that nation states play an important role 
in shaping urban governance. In order to 
understand urban governance it is necessary to 
bring the value dimensions into analysis. 
Institutional theory, which highlights overar-
ching values that give meaning and unders-
tanding to the political process, is the one 
theory according to Pierre, that offers analytical 
assistance (Pierre, 1999).  
The institutional dimension of urban politics is 
conceptualised in a similar way as the new 
institutionalism developed by March and Olsen 
(1984, 1989), and ‘institutions’ refers to sys-
tems of values, traditions, norms, and practices 
that shape or constrain political behaviour 
(Pierre, 1999). In a similar manner to neo-
institutionalists, Pierre makes a distinction 
between organisations and institutions, 
although he recognises the organisational logic 
of institutions and categorises their relationship 
as being very dynamic.  
However there are some doubts about the 
institutional dimension in urban politics. 
“Although institutional theory has become a 
leitmotiv in much of mainstream political 
science, the institutional dimension of urban 
politics remains unclear and ambiguous” 
(Pierre, 1999:373). The main reason for that is 
the much greater constraint of institutions in 
urban governance by organisational factors 
such as constitutional arrangements and other 
types of legal definitions of the responsibilities 
of public organisations, than at the national 
level. However, at state level organisational 
arrangements shape urban politics and 
therefore it is necessary to examine the extent 
and the relationship between institutions and 
organisations in urban politics.  
This argument can be summarised in four 
points. First, governance refers to the process 
through which local authorities, in concert with 
private interests, seek to enhance collective 
goals. It is a process shaped by those systems 
of political, economic and social values from 
which the urban regime derives its legitimacy 
(Pierre, 1999). Second, an understanding of 
local government organisations is fundamental 
for an understanding of urban governance. The 
key question should be centred on the role of 
local government in urban governance. To ad-
dress this it is necessary to bring these aspects 
of urban politics to mainstream political science 
and institutional analysis. Third, different insti-
tutional models of urban governance represent 
different system of values, norms, beliefs, and 
practices. Theses systems produce different 
urban policy choices and outcomes. Just as new 
institutionalists (March and Olsen, 1984; 1989) 
see institutional systems as a result of values 
and norms, the formal organisation of urban 
governance reflects values and interests typical 
to local community. Therefore, urban gover-
nance is embedded in a myriad of economic, 
social, political and historical factors pertaining 
to the exchanges between local state and local 
community. And finally, Pierre acknowledges 
the significance of the national context within 
which urban governance is embedded. “National 
politics and state traditions remain the most 
powerful factors in explaining various aspects of 
urban politics, including urban political 
economy, urban political conflict, and strategies 
of local resource mobilisation” (Gurr and King, 
1987; Keating, 1993; Pickvance and Preteceille, 
1991 in Pierre, 1999: 375). Therefore, nation 
states do effectively constrain local political 
choice
1. Subsequently, and understanding of 
local governance and institutional change in 
Belgrade needs to be seen in the context of 
regime change in Yugoslavia in the 1990. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE SERBIAN 
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD  
The creation of institutions or the building of 
new and better social, political and economic 
institutions is generally considered to be the 
                                                                  
1 Pierre suggests four different models of urban 
governance determined by the national 
institutions: managerial, corporate, pro growth 
and welfare governance models. Although very 
extensive in their approach and field of 
investigation, those models are not applicable to 
the Belgrade case due to the different political 
and economic institutional context of the cities 
where they have been developed and applied. 
central problem that transitional societies face 
as they emerge from their discredited post 
authoritarian and post communist pasts. 
Institutions establish standards, both normative 
and cognitive, as to what is held normal, what 
must be expected, which rights and duties are 
attached to which positions, and what makes 
sense in the community or social domain to 
which the institution is answerable.  
Offe (1996) argues that institutions play two 
major roles, perceptive and functional role. The 
perceptive role means that “good citizens 
make good institutions, and good institutions 
are ‘good’ to the extent they generate and 
cultivate good citizens or the ‘better selves’ of 
citizens, who at least get ‘used to’ and ‘feel at 
home’ in those institutions, develop a sense of 
loyalty, and come to adopt the cognitive 
expectations and moral intuitions from which 
the institutions themselves derive” (Offe, 1996: 
200). The functional role of institutions is 
called ‘congruent socialisation’ which assumes 
that institutions will function properly. In other 
words it means that institutions need to 
accomplish the task that is set for them, or to 
be compatible with the supply of resources 
they depend upon and must hence extract from 
their environment (Offe, 1996). If institutions 
are established properly and widely supported, 
they ‘fly by themselves due to the invisible 
operation of an autopilot’ (Offe, 1996:200). 
Furthermore, Offe argues that both those 
function are necessary as criteria for the 
existence and viability of institutions, internal 
socialisation and external effectiveness, or the 
consolidation of beliefs, on the one hand, and 
purposive rational or strategic action on the 
other (Offe, 1996). 
March and Olsen relate to the same dualism 
(1989: 23), but they define institutionalised 
actions as backward looking which is obliga-
tory, and forward looking or anticipatory moti-
vational forces. The perceptive role of institu-
tions is a  ‘logic of appropriateness’ and se-
cond role is ‘logic of consequentially’ in March 
and Olsen’s work (1984, 1989, 1994). 
However if institution fails, does the failure 
lead to an attitude of doctrinaire over 
identification on the part of actors with the 
rules, values, and routines embodied in the 
institution that fails?  
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The stability of institutions comes at the cost of 
rigidity (Offe, 1996). Democracy as a prefe-
rence aggregating machinery can only work 
under a framework of rights that is protected by 
independent courts and at least relatively 
immune from democratic contingencies. One 
key problem to the Central and Eastern 
European transition from communism is the 
lack of necessary rigidity for stability of 
institutions. Any regime that could enforce 
such rigidity has broken down, and there exists 
too little scope for reasoned choice, as every 
actor has a strong reason to believe that it 
cannot rely upon institutional parameters since 
they are the subjects of sudden change. 
According to Offe (1996) there are two major 
factors that create institutional stability. The 
first is the degree of freedom that institutions 
leave to individual behaviour and choice, and 
the more liberal the regime that institutions 
impose upon agents, the less vulnerable they 
will become to disloyal or attempted innova-
tion. The other stability factor is the mecha-
nism that institutions have in the form of rules 
for changing institutions (Offe, 1996). In Yugo-
slavia, both of the conditions necessary for 
institution stability had not been fulfilled. There 
was neither freedom of choice or mechanisms 
for institutional protection. In Hungary and 
Poland, institutional building was based on the 
logic of appropriateness and in Romania and 
Bulgaria on the logic of consequentially (Offe, 
1996). However, the success of newly built 
institutions is likely to depend more on 
people’s trust, compliance, and patience in 
enduring the transition costs involved than in 
the quality of those institutions themselves. 
Furthermore beside the fact that state com-
munist institutions have failed to generate 
socialist preferences, they have “as a rule, 
generated a state of mind, a set of assumptions 
and expectations that now often turn out to be 
inimical to the growth of democratic capitalist 
and democratic institutions. This state of mind 
regardless of whether it has been cultivated by 
the last fifty years of experience of state socia-
list institutions or the cultural or political inhe-
ritance of the last five hundred years of preca-
rious and often failed modernization process, is 
described by many authors (Moravski, Schöp-
flin, Sztompka, in Offe, 1996), as a combina-
tion of apathy, depletion of communal bonds, 
passivity, unwillingness to accept responsi-
bility, atomization, lack of respect for formal 
rules, ‘short terminism’ and pervasive ‘grab 
and run attitude’ towards economic gain. 
Additionally, economic attitudes are shaped by 
zero-sum-assumptions as well as the 
expectation that success must be, as a rule, 
due to patronage, corruption, and cooperation, 
not effort” (Offe, 1996:217-218). However, 
people need to ‘get used to’ and make sense of 
the new institutions, thus to adopt the set of 
standards, obligations and expectations, or as 
referred to by Weber terminology ‘the spirit of 
institutions’. The success of newly built institu-
t i o n s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  d e p e n d  m o r e  o n  p e o p l e ’ s  
trust, compliance, and patience in enduring the 
transition costs involved than in the quality of 
those institutions themselves. 
Another characteristic of post communist 
societies is that instead of having a ‘downward 
looking’ notion of equality, they have ‘upward 
looking’ variant of distribution which is a pro-
duct of old regime. This means that individuals 
that are trying to become richer have to be 
prevented from it because big private ownership 
is still considered as being negative. But there 
is also a reasoning that unless the state does 
something, people on the top are still privileged 
and are entitled to use every means available 
including illegal ones to get ahead. The toleran-
ce for distributional inequalities and resulting 
privilege is extremely limited (Offe, 1996).  
CONCLUSION 
In the 1990s individuals and parties controlled 
institutions and imposed the rules of game in 
Yugoslavia. The political elite actively transfer-
red power from institutions to its hands, leaving 
institutions as complex and massive as they 
were during the communist era, but lacking 
their former executive power. The ‘collapse’ of 
institutions was not only associated with plan-
ning and development but at all other levels of 
society. Institutions had shrunk at all levels, and 
the basis for democracy was not established, 
and weak ties were solidified. Since institutions 
are no long considered to be static but dynamic 
concepts, institutional rules have to be 
sustained over time. “An ongoing process of 
institutionalisation creates stability” (Lowndes, 
2001: 1958), and this materially failed to occur 
in Yugoslavia. Additionally corruption became 
the dominant ‘logic of appropriateness’. 
Due to the general manifestation of corruption 
new institutionalism is the approach that is 
most promising in relation to theorise the post 
socialist Serbia. Using new institutionalism as 
a theoretical framework means focusing on two 
themes: rules in organizations, and informal 
links. The second focus is a shift from a formal 
to informal conception of institutions, which 
means a focus on informal pressures that 
shaped decision making, rather than the formal 
structures. In particular, the elite that had an 
important role in defining the environment 
should be studied. Institutional factors are 
those that affect the degree of power that actors 
have over decision making and its outcomes 
and the institutional position of actors influen-
ces the definition oh his/her interests, respon-
sibilities and relationships. Additionally, it is 
very important to focus on disaggregated 
conception of institutions and how they produ-
ced deviation in society, and how individuals 
contravened old rules and consequently 
changed them and adopted them to their own 
interests. Moreover, corruption as an accepted 
rule or routine in society can be regarded as an 
institution. The negative logic of appropriate-
ness can be especially applied to the case of 
building in Belgrade, where bribery and 
corruption became a shared value and norm, or 
‘logic of appropriateness’.  
Considering all accounting features of the 
newly emerged institutional framework in Bel-
grade in the 1990s, new institutionalism offers 
the most comprehensive theoretical approach 
for explanation of the development of abnormal 
political practices and institutional deviations.  
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